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The explorer Marco Polo traveled from Italy to exotic parts of Asia
and the Middle East in the thirteenth century.' During his travels, he
maintained a travelogue in which he expressed his perceptions of the
peoples and places he visited. He chronicled his exploits in Asia in gen-
eral, and China in particular. In his travelogue, Marco Polo described
Kublai Kahn's palace and the wonders of China. Perhaps his greatest
contribution was the link he created between east and west, two worlds
profoundly unfamiliar with each other at the time.2 His travelogue pre-
cipitated other European explorations and established a foundation for a
global economic network sustained through commerce.
Marco Polo's desire to explore new worlds and exchange both ideas
and goods should be the impetus behind the Internet. The Internet is
the global economic network of the new millennium. It is a virtual silk
road connecting east and west, and a mechanism to generate wealth for
both. The Chinese government, for example, has indicated that the In-
t Professor of Law, St Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida. This arti-
cle is based on remarks prepared for the Symposium, Federal Data Protection Agency: Reg-
ulating Internet Privacy, September 22, 2000 at the John Marshall Law School.
1. Venetian Adventurer: The Life and Times of Marco Polo 157 (Ronald Letham, Stan-
ford University 1982). For an excellent depiction of Marco Polo's travels through a collec-
tion of photographs and accompanying text, see Alain Cheneviere, Travels in the Orient in
Marco Polo's Footsteps (1997).
2. Jonathan D. Spence, The Chan's Great Continent 3 (1998) (stating that Marco Polo
described China as "a benevolently ruled dictatorship, colossal in scale, decorous in cus-
toms, rich in trade, highly urbanized, inventive in commercial dealings, weak in war.").
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ternet is a vital and intricate part of its goal of modernization. 3 Since
1978, China has advocated a national goal of modernization, and the
country has taken numerous steps in that direction. China's drive to-
wards modernization presents significant concerns for the U.S. as China
seeks to regulate Internet privacy. The concerns center on the fact that
China has millions of people on the Internet, and that number continues
to increase exponentially. Will Western theories and rules of privacy ap-
ply to the global Internet? Will the U.S. compromise other interests to
gain China's cooperation in the Western idea of Internet privacy regula-
tion? With such a tremendous population and enormous economic poten-
tial, will China adopt privacy rules promulgated by a U.S. Federal Data
Protection Agency and the European Union (EU)? Will China comply
with western theories of privacy to govern the Internet or will it offer
substantial resistance?
4
This Article first discusses the factors that have caused both the re-
evaluation of Western notions of privacy, and consideration of the estab-
lishment of a Federal Data Protections Agency. Next, the article
discusses the EU's approach to regulating Internet privacy. This section
is followed by a discussion of why the U.S. and EU approaches to In-
ternet privacy regulation must be implemented from a global, or Marco-
Polo-like perspective, that includes the knowledge and experiences of
other cultures, such as the Islamic world and China. The article then
discusses how the premature establishment of a Federal Data Protection
Agency to regulate Internet privacy may hamper U.S.-China relations.
In conclusion, I articulate the particular concerns of regulating Internet
privacy and demonstrate how the U.S.-China dispute about the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") will resurface
around online privacy if the U.S. engages in unilateral development of
online privacy rules.
3. See generally Asia Rumblings, Doom & Gloom for China's Internets. . .Surprising?
<http://asia.internet.com/Rumblings/00/0211.html> (accessed Feb. 22, 2000) (indicating a
dominate mood in China from the period of Deng Xiaoping and afterwards, has been that
wealth is good and that the Internet is a means to wealth); Canada China Business Fo-
rum, In Search of Growth, China Turns to High-Tech Venture Capital Funds (Mar.-Apr.
2000) (noting that China has vigorously sought foreign investments to develop its high-tech
markets); Blaise Zerega, What Would Mao Think? <http://www.redherring.com/mag/is-
sue83/mag-china-83.html> (Nov. 18, 2000) (discussing the campaign in China to get its
inhabitants online).
4. See Todd G. Hartman, The Marketplace vs. Ideas: The First Amendment Challenges
to Internet Commerce, 12 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 419, 440 (1999) (predicting efforts to regulate
the Internet will meet with considerable resistance). The concern is whether the interna-
tional community will also resist regulation of the Internet. Id.
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II. FACTORS PRECIPITATING THE CONSIDERATION OF A U.S.
FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION AGENCY
It is undeniable that privacy is a right. Privacy in the U.S. is inex-
tricably bound to personal freedom and general well being. 5 The when,
where, and how of Internet privacy regulation have become difficult be-
cause technology has outpaced law.6 Questions have arisen regarding
how to define, regulate and enforce Internet privacy, and whether it is
feasible to establish a U.S. Federal Data Protection Agency? The as-
sumption that there is an urgent need to regulate Internet privacy and
establish a Federal Data Protection Agency is the product of numerous
factors.
One factor is the proliferation of insightful scholarship about the In-
ternet. The pertinent scholarship has deconstructed prevailing views in
the U.S. about Internet privacy regulation and other Internet-related
concerns. Writers such as John Perry Barlow, in his Declaration of Inde-
pendence for Cyberspace, have provocatively asserted that cyberspace
has no sovereignty and should be free from government regulation. 7 An-
other probing question is whether existing privacy laws and organiza-
tions are sufficient to protect online privacy. David G. Post provided an
insightful discussion on this point in his article, Of Horses, Black Holes,
and Decentralized Law-Making in Cyberspace, in which he critiqued
5. The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce <http://www.
ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm> (accessed Feb. 22, 2000); see e.g. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 8 (1964) (noting that in the U.S. the right to privacy is a means to acknowledge a correla-
tion between privacy, conscience, and the soul). U.S. Const. Amend. V. The Fifth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution specifies, "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." The Malloy Court indicated that this clause protects
the right of a person to remain silent unless that person chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of free will. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8. See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
759 (1966) (explaining that the admissibility of blood withdrawn from a person suspected of
driving while intoxicated did not violate the Fifth Amendment protection against self-in-
crimination because the blood sample was neither testimonial nor communicative in na-
ture). In other decisions, the Court held that neither voice demonstrations nor field
sobriety tests were testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 592, 616 (1990); United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975) (stating that the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination only applies to testimonial evidence because the privilege pro-
tects the 'private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought.").
6. Frederick Schauer, Symposium, Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinc-
tion, 38 Jurimetrics J. 555 (1998) (indicating that the law looks backwards, and therefore,
has difficulty dealing with change). According to the author, the Internet and related tech-
nologies have altered privacy is several respects: quantatively, the Internet has made it
easier to access numerous databases; qualitatively, the Internet has created new ways to
invade privacy; and, conceptually, notions of privacy are dependent on technological capa-
bilities. Id.
7. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace 8 <http://www.
webveranda.com/freedom/doi.html> (accessed Feb. 6, 2000).
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Judge Frank Easterbrook's premise that existing theories of law are suf-
ficient to address the factual and legal disputes that arise on the In-
ternet.8 Easterbrook presented the challenge-in his insightful analogy
of the law of the horse-that there is really no such law as Internet law,
and that existing laws are sufficient to resolve Internet-related disputes.
There is also Lawrence Lessig's challenge from his seminal text, Code
and Other Laws of Cyberspace, that societies should not rely upon an
invisible hand to regulate the Internet, rather citizens should build a
free and open society on the Internet because [1]eft to itself, cyberspace
will become a perfect tool of control. 9 Furthermore, Michael Froomkin
in his article, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Crypto-
graphic Key Escrow, discussed the necessity for secure communications
via encryption and the international implications of such technology. 10
There are also the insights of Joel R. Reidenberg in his article, Lex In-
formatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Tech-
nology, in which he noted that law and government are not the only
sources of rule making and that ground rules for the Internet can also
arise out of networks from a Lex Informatica. 11 These articles, and nu-
merous others, have generated considerable discussion about the future
direction of Internet regulation.
A second factor is the public fear that the relentless march of com-
merce [will] plow over privacy concerns. 12 In a Wall Street Journal-
NBC poll, people were asked, In the new millennium, what threats do
you fear most? 13 The response was not the usual, i.e., war, environmen-
tal degradation, inadequate social security, inadequate public school, il-
legal drugs, crime, or world hunger; instead, the response was loss of
personal privacy.14 Another poll conducted by Price Waterhouse re-
8. David G. Post, Of Horses, Black Holes, and Decentralized Law-Making in Cyber-
space 3 <http://webserver.law.yale.edu/censor/post.htm> (accessed Oct. 16, 2000); but see
generally Symposium, Surveying Law and Borders: Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996) (predicting the potential emergence of new rules
to govern cyberspace).
9. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 5-6 (Basic Books 1999).
10. A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Cryptographic
Key "Escrow," 15 U. Chi. L. Forum (1996) (reprinted in <http://www.law.miami.edul
-froomkin/ articles/planet clipper.htm>.
11. Joel R. Reidenberg, Informatica Lex: The Formation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 553, 554-55 (1998).
12. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Introduction: 1999-2000 Oliver Wendell Holmes Symposium
and Lectureship: The Marketplace of Ideas in Cyberspace, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 817, 891
(2000).
13. Id. at 890. (providing the observations of offered by panelist Daniel Jaffe, Execu-
tive Vice President, Government Relations, of the Association of National Advertisers).
14. Id.; see Stanton McCandlish, The Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFFs Top 12
Ways to Protect Online Privacy <http://www.eff.orgtpub/Privacy/eff.privacytop-12.html>
(accessed Oct. 16, 2000). Privacy concerns have precipitated self-help methods to protect
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vealed that 86 percent of Americans were concerned about an invasion of
their privacy on the Internet. 15 Additionally, a Georgetown University
survey revealed that 92.8 [%] of ... [Web] sites ... [surveyed] collected
at least one type of personal identifying information. 16 The commercial
interests associated with the Internet realize that e-commerce will
whither and die unless consumer fears about a lack of privacy are allevi-
ated. 17 This has ushered forth a demand from commercial interests for
self regulation of the Internet.18 In response, some suggest that govern-
ment regulation is preferable, perhaps through a newly established Fed-
eral Data Protection Agency.
A third factor is the sheer volume of subject matter on the Internet.
The Internet is used for educational, commercial and entertainment pur-
poses. Its users include individuals, organizations, institutions and busi-
nesses. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been charged with the
task of protecting consumers on the Internet under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which mandates that the FTC protect consumers from
unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts or practices. 19 This
has been a formidable task for the FTC because it has the additional task
of enforcing 40 additional statutes and 30 separate rules. 20 For example,
privacy. Id. In an attempt to demonstrate how your privacy is affected by using the In-
ternet, one site provides immediate information about your configuration and the URL pre-
viously visited. See e.g. CNIL, <http://www.cnil.fr/uk/traces/demonst/uk_config.htm>
(accessed Oct. 16, 2000) (displaying an Internet user's remote host, remote ADDR, http
User agent, http referer, DNS address, IP address, operating system, browser, last site
visited).
15. Charles F. Luce, Jr., Internet Privacy: SPAv and Cookies: How to Avoid Indiges-
tion While Binging at the World Wide Automat, 27 Colo. Law. 27 (1998).
16. Mary J. Culnan, Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey: A Report to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission <http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/gippshome.html> (accessed
Oct. 16, 2000).
17. Dennis C. Vacco, Internet Privacy 1997: The Year in Review, National Association
of Attorneys General: Consumer Protection Committee (available in LEXIS, 1997-DEC
NAAGCPR 1 (Dec. 1997)). See Culnan, supra n. 16, at 3 (stating online sales in the U.S.
alone reached 7 billion in 1998 and commercial interests are concerned about consumer
fears and the risk to e-business).
18. Nancy Lazar, Consumer Online: Your Right to Privacy in Cyberspace, 10 Loy. Con-
sumer L. Rev. 117, 118 (1998). In response to possible government regulation of the In-
ternet, several U.S. high-tech companies formed a coalition to facilitate e-commerce. Id.
They formulated a position paper in which they stressed self regulation. Id. The compa-
nies included: Apple Computer, Compaq Computer, Data General, Hewlett-Packard, IBM,
NCR, Silicon Graphics, Sun Microsystems, Stratus Computer, and Unisys. Id.; see also
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry Into the
Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Leg. Forum 77, 80 (1996) (noting the corpo-
rate sector's interests in enhancing business relations with their customers through infor-
mation about consumers, citizens, and employees poses a threat to individual privacy).
19. John Graubert & Jill Coleman, Consumer Protection and Antitrust Enforcement at
the Speed of Light: The FTC Meets the Internet, 25 Can.-U.S. L.J. 275, 276 (1999).
20. Id.
20001
174 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW
a grossly understaffed FTC has been bombarded with unprecedented
mega-mergers, which exceeded $1.8 trillion in 1999.21 The massive vol-
ume and complexity of tasks demanded of the FTC has generated con-
cerns about whether the FTC should handle Internet-related consumer
concerns or whether a newly established Federal Data Protection Agency
is a viable alternative.
A fourth factor is the ongoing debate over the government's role in
regulating the Internet in general and online privacy in particular.
Some critics either have a distrust of government or they simply perceive
industry self regulation as a more efficient method to regulate the In-
ternet.22 Perhaps this trepidation about government regulation is legiti-
mate in light of numerous U.S. federal agencies' failure to protect
consumers' privacy on the Internet. In an effort to promote the efficiency
of the marketplace, the FTC has identified potential consumer protection
issues, held public forums, and strongly encouraged self regulation.
2 3
Furthermore, the FTC has established four fair information principles
for the protection of consumer privacy on the Internet. The four princi-
ples are notice (notification of a Web site's data collection practices),
choice (the right to opt out), access (to one's personal data) and security
(assurance that the data provided is secure).24 In the past, these princi-
ples have been used to evaluate the conduct of commercial sites on the
Internet. Recently, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) studied
how federal government agencies fared when measured against the
FTC's fair information principles for commercial Web sites. The GAO
results demonstrate that government agencies are failing to comply with
the FTC principles for online privacy protection.
As of July 2000, all of the 65 web sites in our survey collected personal
identifying information from their visitors, and 85 percent of the sites
posted a privacy notice.The majority of these federal sites (69 percent)
also met FTC's criteria for Notice. However, a much smaller number of
sites implemented the three remaining principles -Choice (45 percent),
Access (17 percent), and Security (23 percent). Few of the federal sites
- 3 percent- implemented elements of all four of FTC's fair informa-
tion principles. Finally, a small number of sites (22 percent) disclosed
that they may allow third-party cookies; 14 percent actually allowed
21. Jeanna Greene, FTC Affected by Deluge of Mergers, Natl. L.J. B5 (Sept. 18, 2000).
22. Fred H. Cate, Principles of Internet Privacy, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 877, 890 (2000) (as-
serting that "when it comes to privacy, Americans generally do not assume that the govern-
ment necessarily has citizens' best interests at heart.").
23. David Medine, Regulatory Issues in Internet Privacy: The FTC's Role 1I 5 (May
1998) (available in WL, 3 No. 1 GLEBLCR 7).
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their placement.2 5
One commentator amply articulated consumer fears of Big Brother
in stating, Nobody is going to be out there protecting me. I don't think
the EU and the data czar will protect me. I very much doubt that the
federal government will protect me. In fact, they are the most frighten-
ing aspect of the whole thing. 26 In effect, consumers are concerned
about whether the Federal Government is a protector of privacy or the
primary predator that devours privacy rights.
27
A fifth factor that has generated thought about the feasibility of a
Federal Data Protection Agency is the tremendous array of privacy laws
within the U.S. Privacy within the U.S. is broadly categorized into two
spheres, transactional and informational. 28 The former encompasses the
right to prohibit other people or the Government from knowing what a
person engages in at a given moment. The later, encompasses the right
to prohibit other people or the Government from obtaining information
about a person's past. These broad generalized conceptions of privacy
provide categories, but fail to depict the depth of sources for privacy con-
cerns in the U.S.
Professor Dorothy Glancy has provided a comprehensive discussion
on how the application of privacy laws to the Internet leads to considera-
ble complexity and uncertainty.2 9 Glancy explains that U.S. privacy law
is diverse, decentralized and dynamic.30 Privacy laws are diverse be-
cause different types of privacy law arise from constitutional law, com-
mon law, statutory law, regulatory law, and self-regulatory measures.
3 1
25. Letter from Honorable Dick Armey, Majority Leader, House of Rep., to Honorable
W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade and Consumer Protection
Comm. On Commerce, Internet Privacy: Comparison of Federal Agency Practices With
FTC's Fair Information Principles (Sept. 11, 2000) (copy on file with the author).
26. Symposium, Privacy in Cyberspace Transcripts from the 1999 Judge James R.
Browning Symposium, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 43, 49 (2000) [hereinafter Privacy in Cyberspace].
27. David Stout, Major University to be Asked to Review F.B.I.'s 'Carnivore,' N.Y.
Times 91 5 <http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/08/biztech/articles/llcnd-carnivore.
html> (accessed Aug. 15, 2000). Public fears about the Federal Government's cyber-sur-
veillance through a program called Carnivore has prompted the U.S. Justice Department
and a major university to review the FBI's e-mail surveillance program to determine how
and when the Federal Government has invaded individual privacy. Id. Patricia Mell,
Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wil-
derness, 11 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1, 48-56 (1996) (discussing the U.S. Government's interest
in collecting data about individuals).
28. Privacy in Cyberspace, supra n. 26, at 43.
29. Dorothy Glancy, Symposium, At The Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds:
United States Privacy and The Internet, 16 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 357,
358 (2000).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 364; see also F. Lawrence Street & Mark P. Grant, Law of The Internet, 109-
220 (Lexis Law 2000) (listing common law privacy rights, constitutional privacy rights,
20001
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Each source of law generates volumes of jurisprudence and questions
about the definition, scope, regulation and enforcement of privacy in both
the real world and the cyberworld.
Professors Paul Schwartz and Pamela Samuelson have also dis-
cussed the flaws in U.S. privacy laws. Schwartz states that it is time to
consider a new definition of privacy, which defines privacy norms as
shifting and multidimensional. 3 2 According to Schwartz, privacy laws
are cloaked in uncertainty, and this has a negative impact on individual
self-determination and is unhealthy in a deliberative democracy.
3 3
Schwartz proposes, "In place of the existing privacy horror show, we
need . . . fair information practices."3 4 Samuelson has explained,". . . a
serious impediment to a comprehensive approach [to the challenge of in-
formation privacy] in the U.S. is the lack of clarity in this country about
the nature of the interest that individuals have in information about
themselves: Is it a commodity interest, a consumer protection interest, a
personal dignity interest, a civil right interest, all of the above, or no
interest at all?"
3 5
The above factors of increased scholarship, public rage, the volume
of subject matter on the Internet, the debate about the role of govern-
ment, and the proliferation of privacy laws have created a vacuum. This
vacuum, has in turn, presented a dilemma of how to place the Internet
under increased surveillance while protecting both commercial interests
and individual privacy. Because the Internet is unlike any other me-
dium it raises questions about whether the traditional theories of prop-
erty, speech and privacy apply. Due to the Internet, these theories are in
a state of flux, and the resulting disorder seemingly demands an urgent
solution. One reference point is the approach adopted by the EU, which
has established a privacy commission or agency. Although an appealing
model, the U.S. should proceed with caution when considering the adop-
tion of the EU's approach for regulating Internet privacy.
statutory privacy protections, and privacy legislation in the U.S.); see generally Jonathan
Cody, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the Time Come to Abandon Self-Regula-
tion?, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1192-1206 (1999); Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfeld, Privacy
Please: Will the Internet Industry Act to Protect Consumer Privacy Before Government Steps
In?, 54 Bus. Lawyer 349, 357 (1998) (available in WL, 54 BUSLAW 349).
32. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 815, 834 (2000).
33. Id. at 833; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L.
Rev. 1607 (Nov. 1999).
34. Id. at 1607 (defining fair information practices as obligations, transparent process-
ing systems, limited procedural and substantive rights, and external oversight).
35. Pamela Samuelson, Symposium, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
1125, 1170 (May 2000).
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III. EUROPEAN UNION & THE UNITED STATES NOTIONS
OF PRIVACY
On October 24, 1995, the European Parliament and the Council of
the European Union adopted Directive 95/46/EC [hereinafter "EU Direc-
tive"].36 The objective of the EU Directive was to facilitate among states
the adoption of laws to protect an individual's fundamental right to pri-
vacy with respect to the processing of personal data and the flow of data
between states. 37 The EU Directive recognizes privacy as a fundamental
human right.38 The EU Directive's guidelines for information privacy
are: personal data is collected for specific legitimate purposes; the data
must be relevant, accurate, current, not excessive and kept no longer
than necessary; personal data may be processed only if the Internet user
has unambiguously given consent (or under specified exceptions); mem-
ber states must establish supervisory bodies, (e.g., commissions, regula-
tory agencies) and remedies for a breach of privacy rights; and, transfer
of data to a third country is restricted unless the third country has an
adequate level of protection for data privacy.3 9 The EU Directive is
deemed to be more protective of privacy rights than the privacy protec-
tions within the U.S. because the former recognizes privacy as a funda-
mental right and requires member states to appoint a privacy regulator
or commissioner and establish national privacy laws, while the latter has
failed to develop a coherent definition for privacy.
40
The EU Directive places considerable pressure on the U.S. to regu-
36. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 24 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281/33) $$ 75-93 <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
en/lif/dat/1995/ en_395L0046.html> (accessed Aug. 30, 2000) (commenting on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of
such data).
37. Id. at $ 76 The object of the Directive provides: "In accordance with this Directive,
Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and
in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. Member
States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between Member
States for reasons connected with the protection afforded under paragraph 1." Id.
38. Id. at 9$ 1, 10, 37; see also Al Gidari & Marie Aglion, EU Directive on Privacy May
Hinder E-Commerce, IP Magazine 91 1 <http://www.ipmag.com/dailies/ 980629.html> (June
29, 1998).
39. Donna N. Lampert, Internet Privacy: An Overview of Domestic and International
Issues and Policy Responses 372 (Mar. 2000) (available in WL, 597 PLI/Pat 357); see also
Kurt Wimmer, Internet Privacy and Free Expression: New Media for the New Millennium
18 (Spring 2000) (available in WL, 18-Spg. ComLaw 1); Eric J. Sinrod, Jeffrey W. Reyna &
Barak D. Jolish, The New Wave of Speech and Privacy Developments in Cyberspace, 21
Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 583, 595 (1999).
40. Karl D. Belgum, Who Leads at Half-Time?: Three Conflicting Visions of Internet
Privacy policy, 6 Rich. J. L. & Tech. 1, 66 (1999).
2000]
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late Internet privacy and provide adequate protections. 41 The EU Di-
rective's requirement of adequate protection and government regulation
caused grave concerns for U.S. businesses with a preference for self regu-
lation. Although the U.S. did not join as one of the member states that
adopted the EU Directive, the U.S. later reached a safe harbor agree-
ment with the EU.4 2 This agreement was reached through the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce to encourage the implementation of effective
protections for consumer privacy on the Internet.43 The approach taken
in the safe harbor agreement is a departure from the EU Directive.
While the EU Directive seeks to promote the creation of privacy laws by
member states, the safe harbor agreement seeks to encourage self-regu-
latory efforts in the private sector for data collection and dissemination.
Under the safe harbor Agreement, a U.S. company must register with
the FTC, commit itself to comply with the EU Directive, notify customers
when data is collected, provide for an opt-out opportunity, and allow In-
ternet users to obtain and modify information held by the company.
4 4
Adherence to the principles of the safe harbor Agreement is entirely
voluntary.
45
The cultural and jurisprudential differences between the EU and the
U.S. are depicted in their different policies and practices to governing
Internet privacy. Privacy protections under the EU Directive are stricter
than in the U.S. Under the EU Directive, privacy is a fundamental right,
whereas, in the U.S., privacy has developed more piecemeal and state-
by-state. In the U.S., for example, most state legislatures discussed, de-
bated or passed privacy legislation during their respective 2000 legisla-
tive sessions. 4 6 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court, unlike the EU, has
not recognized a fundamental right to privacy. Rather, the Court has
addressed various issues related to privacy and found privacy rights im-
plicit in the Bill of Rights.
47
41. Thomas J. D'Amico & June E. Cohan, Eye On Washington 22 (Mar. 1999) (availa-
ble in WL, 1 No. 5 E-Commerce L. Rep. 22).
42. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles T 1
<http:l/www.epic.org/privacy/intl/doc-safeharbor-1198.html> (DOC Nov. 4, 1998).
43. Id.
44. Wimmer, supra n. 39, at 18; see also Sinrod, supra n. 39, at 595.
45. U.S. Depart. of Commerce, supra n. 42, at 1.
46. See e.g. Government Relations, State Privacy Legislation <http://www.sia.com/
stateaffairs/htmlstate-privacy issues.html> (accessed Nov. 22, 2000).
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating that although a right to
privacy is not expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution, it is implicit in the Bill of Rights);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy against certain government intru-
sions); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 643, 713 (1976) (recognizing a right to privacy for marriage
and child rearing); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing that a woman's deci-
sion whether to terminate her pregnancy is a privacy right).
[Vol. XIX
FEDERAL DATA PROTECTION AGENCY
Furthermore, unlike the EU, data privacy in the U.S. has been con-
strued as a matter of commerce rather than a fundamental right because
the power to regulate Internet privacy is within the jurisdiction of the
FTC. In a report to Congress, the FTC suggested legislation to establish
standards for the collection and use of information online for profiling
and the creation of an agency to enforce those standards. 48 The FTC also
emphasized that self regulation by the private sector was the most effec-
tive and least intrusive method to ensure fair trade, access, choice, secur-
ity, enforcement and other consumer protections on the Internet.
4 9
Despite the different approaches adopted by the U.S. and the EU to regu-
lating Internet privacy, both have begun serious consideration of the is-
sue. Notwithstanding these efforts, the global nature of the Internet
makes its regulation a matter beyond the geographical boundaries of the
U.S. and Europe.
IV. WESTERN THEORIES OF PRIVACY FOR THE
GLOBAL COMMUNITY?
The Internet connects the world unlike any other medium and has
made geographical distances less relevant. 50 It is impractical to define
privacy on the Internet from a Western perspective without the input of
nations throughout the world. While the U.S. enters the new millen-
nium and considers the establishment of a Federal Data Protection
Agency, caution should be exercised lest privacy rules are established
and it is later discovered that the rules are one-dimensional and obso-
lete. Technology is moving rapidly, and all societies throughout the
world have concepts of privacy.5 1 It may behoove the West to consider
privacy concepts offered by moral philosophy and anthropology to deter-
mine whether privacy is a universal or local concept, or both.52 In the
48. Federal Trade Commission Rpt., Online Profiling: A Report to Congress, Part 2
Recommendations (July 2000) T 9 <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.htm>.
49. Federal Trade Commission Rpt., Self-Regulation and Privacy Online 5 <http://
www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/pt071399.htm> (accessed Oct. 24, 2000).
50. David R. Johnson & David Post, Symposium, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1370-76 (May 1996). See also Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.,
Cyberspace and The Use of Force 18-25 (Aegis Research 1999) (suggesting that war in the
21st century will take a new form and include computer espionage and computer network
attacks because of the world's interconnectedness). The targets of war will include critical
infrastructures such as: telecommunications, electrical and power systems, gas and oil
storage, transportation, banking and finance, water supply system, emergency services and
the continuity of government.
51. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev.
1193, 1212 (Apr. 1998) (indicating that there are zones of privacy in each culture, even if
culturally, we react differently to certain disclosures).
52. Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of Privacy for
the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 1, 10-12
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quest to define and regulate Internet privacy, the U.S. and the EU must
adopt a "Marco-Polo-like" approach and seek the cultural and intellec-
tual perspectives of other nations. A contemporary definition of privacy
must include a global perspective5 3 and extend beyond a pre-Marco Polo
perspective that the West comprises the entire world.5 4 The U.S. and
EU must acknowledge that the world is more interconnected than in the
past and that the Internet is a global mechanism or virtual silk road of
information and commerce. 5 5 This acknowledgment is critical for gov-
erning privacy on the global Internet, which in 1995 reached 100 coun-
tries,5 6 and by 2004 will reach 1.4 billion people worldwide. 5 7
In an effort to establish a global consensus on privacy, a group called
Privacy International published a report titled, Privacy & Human Rights
1999.58 The report outlines the threats to privacy, provides a definition
of privacy, and explains the right to privacy and the technologies that
threaten and invade privacy.5 9 According to the report approximately 40
(1998) (discussing the works of Alan Westin who surveyed privacy concepts, including the
theories of renowned anthropologist Margaret Mead).
53. Gillian Triggs, Confucius and Consensus: International Law in the Asian Pacific,
21 Melb. U. L. Rev. 650, 652-53 (Dec. 1997) (noting in 1945 when the Charter of the United
Nations was signed, there were only 50 nations, and they shared a similar cultural back-
ground). However, since 1945, 89 countries have undergone decolonization and have
demonstrated belief systems at variance with Western values. Id.
54. 2000 I.C.J. Acts & Docs., Statute of the International Court of Justice <http:ll
www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm> (accessed Nov. 22,
2000). The perception that the West comprised the entire world and other people were
insignificant or uncivilized existed as late as the 20th century. Id. For example, when
nations decided to establish the International Court of Justice it was agreed that disputes
would be settled through the application of, inter alia, "the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations." Id. The term "civilized" is from article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Id.
55. See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 23-28 (1994) (noting the world has become more
interdependent and that the former USSR and the United States can no longer maintain
global bipolar dominance). See also Jane Perlez, With Time Short, Albright Stays Aloft,
N.Y. Times, A7 (July 3, 2000) (indicating that Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State for
the Clinton Administration, advocated a global community with emphasis on Internet liter-
acy in nations under dictatorships).
56. Karen S. Frank, Potential Liability on the Internet, 437 PLI 417, 421 (1996) (citing
statistics from the International Internet Association).
57. The ARC Group, Wireless Internet: Applications; Technology & Player Strategies
<http://www.the-arc-group.com/reports/wireless-2000/titlepagewi2k.htm> (accessed Oct.
24, 2000).
58. Privacy International, Privacy & Human Rights 1999 <http://www.privacy inter-
national.org/survey/summary.html> (accessed Oct. 24, 2000) (indicating that privacy is a
fundamental right recognized by all major international treaties and agreements on
human rights).
59. Id. Such technologies include identity cards, biometrics, communications surveil-
lance, interception of e-mail and Internet communications, national security and the eche-
lon system, video surveillance, and workplace surveillance. Id.
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nations have enacted privacy and data protection laws to protect In-
ternet privacy.
60
The fact that approximately 40 nations have enacted privacy laws
for the Internet appears impressive; however, that number represents a
small percentage of the 190 independent states6 1 and approximately 50
dependencies and areas of special sovereignty. 62 Notably, two "major
parts of the world" are not present in this global effort to define privacy
on the Internet. These are the Islamic cultures and China. Both are
characterized as "major parts of the world" because they constitute a sig-
nificant percentage of the world's population.6 3 World population has
reached 5.9 billion,6 4 with the total number of Muslims estimated at 1
billion,6 5 and the population of China estimated at 1.243 billion. 66 Ap-
proximately, one out of five people in the world live in China. Further-
more, China has a large Muslim population with 40,000 imams, 26,000
mosques 6 7 and millions of Chinese Muslims on Mainland China.68 Con-
60. Id. (listing privacy measures adopted by such countries as Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ice-
land, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Russia, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan).
61. U.S. State Dept., Independent States of the World <http://www.state.gov/www/re-
gionslindependentstates.html> (accessed Oct. 24, 2000) (listing 190 independent states).
62. U.S. State Dept., Dependencies & Areas of Special Sovereignty <http://
www.stategov/www.regions/dependencies.html#> (accessed Oct. 24, 2000).
63. For information about China's population see, United Nations, 1998 Revision of
World Population Estimates and Projections <http://www.popin.org/pop1998/1.htm> (ac-
cessed Oct. 25, 2000) (indicating that 2 out of 5 people in the world live in either China or
India). Although beyond the scope of this article, data indicates that India has also
emerged as a technologically orientated society. Id.; See Standard.com, India Eyes Steps to
Bring Info Tech to the Masses (available at <http://www.thestandard.net/article/display/
0,1151,17689,00.html>) (accessed Oct. 25, 2000) (explaining India has made tremendous
efforts to use the Internet and related technologies for economic development); Cyber Law
To Come Into Effect in a Month, Arab News 8 (Aug. 16, 2000) (noting despite a lack of an
expressed right to privacy in its constitution, India has passed laws for commercial trans-
actions covering digital records, signatures, and transactions all of which were illegal until
India passed a Information Technology Act in mid-2000); Privacy and Human Rights Over-
view, An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Practice, <http://www,gilc.org/privacy/
survey/intro.html> (noting that along with the U.S. and Ireland, India does not have an
expressed right to privacy in its constitution, but it has recognized a right to privacy).
64. United Nations, supra n. 63.
65. The World Almanac and In-Depth Book of Facts 727 (Robert Famighetti et al. eds.,
1994).
66. People's Republic of China Yearbook 1998/99 vol. 18, 362 (1998/99).
67. Id. at 370. (noting the other main religions in China are Buddhism, Taoism, and
Christianity).
68. See generally Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's
Republic (1991) (discussing the history of Islam in China); Marco Restelli, China's Secret
Holy War, World Press Rev., 43 (May 1994) (explaining that statistics about the number of
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sequently, one-fifth of the world's population resides in China, one-fifth
are Muslims, and a significant number are both Chinese and Muslim.
Eventually, both the Islamic world and China will adopt the In-
ternet as an integral part of their economies. 6 9 Interestingly, both have
domestic legal systems or customs at variance with Western jurispru-
dence. 70 Along with these cultures, there are other cultures with tremen-
dous populations of peoples who have different legal systems, cultures,
and perceptions of what is private and protected. 7 1 The increasing popu-
larity of the Internet in these cultures raises concerns about whether the
definition and regulation of privacy promulgated by a U.S. Federal Data
Protection Agency will prove adequate for the global Internet? At a min-
imum, any Western attempt to regulate Internet privacy must assimi-
late the knowledge and cultures of Asia and the Middle East, similar to
Marco Polo in the 13th century, in order to facilitate the global Internet
virtual silk road of e-commerce.
The difference between culture and law in the West and in an Is-
lamic culture is depicted in Saudi Arabia's strong interest in regulating
the Internet. 72 The Saudi government deliberately limits access to the
Internet. It costs more to access the Internet in Saudi Arabia than any
Muslims in China vary, but estimates a total of 50 million). See also Bureau of East Asian
& Pacific Affairs, Background Notes: China, August 1998 <http://www.state.gov/www/back-
ground-notes/ china_1098_bgn.htm> (accessed Oct. 25, 2000) (stating the Chinese govern-
ment places the number at 18 million).
69. This assertion is based on the general view that the Internet is a means to gener-
ate wealth. See e.g. Thomas S. Valovic, Digital Mythologies 27-28 (Rutgers U. Press 2000)
(stating there is a general perception that computer networks generate wealth through
new economic orders and the elimination of "multilayered inefficiencies that have become
characteristic of the institutions of modern corporate and government life."). The Chinese
government has specifically stated that it expects the Internet to invigorate Chinese busi-
nesses so they can compete with the West. Id.; See Peter Ferdinand, The Internet, Democ-
racy and Democratization 4 (2000).
70. Contra Anastasia Stanmeyer & Paul Mooney, AsiaWeek.com, An Identity Crisis
The Collapse of Ideology Leaves Generations Adrift in a Moral Vacuum <http:l/
www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweeklmagazine/99/0924/cn-society.html> (accessed July 17,
2000) (arguing that China has lost it cultural focus which it had under Maoism, and that
today's China has become culturally and morally adrift because it is swayed by the free-
market economy and pop culture).
71. Rene David, Les Grands Systems De Droit Contemporaines 22-32 (5th ed. 1973),
cited in Lakshman D. Guruswamy et al., International Environmental Law And World Or-
der: A Problem Orientated Course Book 136 n.4 (1999) (explaining there are five dominant
legal systems throughout the world: the Romanist-German-Civilist legal system, the Com-
mon law legal system, the Marxist-Socialist legal system, the Islamic legal system, and, the
Asian legal system).
72. Douglas Jehl, The Internet's 'Open Sesame' Is Answered Warily <http://www. ny-
times.com/library/tech/99/03/biztech/articles/18riyadh.html> (accessed Aug. 19, 2000) (stat-
ing that besides Saudi Arabia, other Islamic countries also have conservative approaches
toward the Internet due to religious, cultural, and state security concerns).
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other place in the world.7 3 Exorbitant costs allow the Saudi government
to control the who, what, when, where, and how behind Internet access.
There are also filters on the Internet in Saudi Arabia, and these filters
slow down access and further discourage Internet use in Saudi Arabia.
7 4
The filters are a product of Saudi Arabia's efforts to impose strict censor-
ship policies on Internet users. The Saudi government, for example,
blocks America Online, and the 30 Internet service providers operating
in Saudi Arabia are prohibited from connecting to the Internet via satel-
lite.7 5 Such government conduct raises a concern about how the Saudi
government will define and regulate the privacy rights of Saudi citizens
on the Internet as it balances privacy rights against the need to control
the flow of information.
7 6
Along with culture, the laws in Islamic countries may impact
whether the U.S. can effectively provide a global framework to define,
regulate, and protect Internet privacy. The Islamic legal system is a via-
ble legal system with laws governing Internet-related topics such as
banking, torts, and contracts. 77 Islamic jurisprudence has a distinct
banking system that forbids interest, and characterizes interest as
usury.78 The Islamic system of commercial law challenges Western com-
73. See generally NEWS, Cyber Rebels, Star-Tribune Newspaper of the Twin Cities
Mpls.-St. Paul (Aug. 1, 1999) (available in 1999 WL 7506258).
74. Id.
75. Andy Serwer, Tech is King; Now Meet the Prince, Fortune, 105-06, 117 (Dec. 6,
1999) (noting that the standard for Internet access in Saudi Arabia is different for the royal
family, which has access to satellite connections).
76. Shafaq Al-Otaibi, 3,000 Porno Films Seized in Abqaiq; Three Indians Held, Arab
News, 2 (July 22, 2000). The Saudi government seems particularly concerned about con-
trolling the flow of pornographic materials on the Internet and through any other means.
Id. Between April 2000 and July 2000, the Saudi government arrested numerous persons
who sold or rented pornographic videos and confiscated 13,000 pornographic videos. Id.
77. John Makdisi & Marianne Makdisi, Islamic Law Bibliography: Revised and Up-
dated List of Secondary Sources, 87 L. Lib. J. 69 (1995); see also, John Makdisi, The Islamic
Origins of the Common Law, 77 N. Car. L. Rev. 1635 (1999); Abdulmunin Shakir, Constitu-
tions of the Countries of the World (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert M. Flanz eds., 1976). The
Saudi government has indicated that the Quran is its constitution. Id. Along with the
Quran, the other sources of Islamic law are: Sunnah (traditions of Prophet Muhammad);
Quas (reasoning on issues and problems that have an analogy in the Qur'an or Sunnah);
Idjtihad (reasoning on issues and problems that do not have an analogy in the Qur'an or
Sunnah); and, Idjma (consensus of learned Islamic scholars). Id. See also Omar Saleem,
Be Fruitful and Multiply, and Replenish the Earth and Subdue It: Third World Population
Growth and Global Warming, 8 Geo. Int'l. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1995). Due to globalization,
Islamic scholars have begun to grapple with the Islamic perspective for interest-based
banking, credit accounts, import contracts, and investments. See Islamic Scholars to Meet
in Riyadh to Debate Modern Topics, Arab News 2 (Sept. 22, 2000); Javid Massan & Mabib
Badr, Islamic Jurists debate Key Questions Arab News 2 (Sept. 25, 2000) (discussing the
impermissibility of using Internet-based credit cards).
78. The Qur'an provides: "0 you who believe! Do not live on usury, multiplying your
wealth many times over (as compound interests)." Id. Abdullah Yusuf'Ali, The Meaning of
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mercial concepts in two significant ways. 79 It challenges the general be-
lief that Western concepts of commerce are more efficient and superior,
and it challenges the belief that commerce should be separate from relig-
ion.8 0 Will either of these challenges present a threat to a global defini-
tion of privacy propounded by the West in its efforts to regulate online
commercial transactions? If so, how will such threats impact e-com-
merce? The popularity of Internet use in Islamic cultures simultaneously
raises concerns about Internet regulation. How will the Saudi govern-
ment allow surfing of the Internet for e-commerce purposes and simulta-
neously perpetuate its need to monitor the conduct of its citizens? How
will such a government define and regulate Internet privacy? The Saudi
Arabian combination of a monarchal government, religion, and commer-
cial interests, may generate a privacy policy significantly different from
the Western views of privacy.
Although the Islamic world could possibly impact Internet privacy,
it is unlikely to do so in the immediate future. This assertion is based on
the number of Internet users in Islamic countries, 8 and the fact that the
Islamic world is fragmented,8 2 and has few Islamic states that are gov-
erned by "pure" Islamic law without secular based law in their legal sys-
tem.8 3 Centralized government has stifled Internet growth in Islamic
countries. Conversely, China, even with a centralized government, has
seen its total number of Internet users grow exponentially every 6
months. It is, therefore, probable that China will have the greatest im-
mediate impact on shaping a global definition for Internet privacy.
the Holy Qur'an, 3:130 (Amana Pub. 1997). From the Islamic point of view, credit cards are
permissible if the cardholder pays the bill on time and is not charged interest. See Credit
Cards and Late Payment, Arab News 19 (Sept. 29, 2000).
79. Frank Vogel & Samuel L. Hayes, III, Islamic Law and Finance Religion, Risk and
Return 19 (Kluwer L. Intl. 1998).
80. Id.
81. See Kingdom's Banks Embark on Internet Race, Arab News, 14 (Aug. 23, 2000)
(stating that the Internet arrived late in Saudi Arabia, where Internet services were avail-
able for the first time in 1999).
82. Saleem, supra n. 78, at 1 (1995) (noting the inaccurateness of the popular impres-
sion that Muslims are a homogeneous population from the Middle East). Over four-fifths of
the world's 1 billion Muslims live in Asia and Southeast Asia. Id. The country with the
largest Muslim population is Indonesia, followed by Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Id.
Each country with a Muslim population brings their own cultural differences and exper-
iences to the religion. Id. Dr. Atta-ur-Rahman, Pakistani minister for science and technol-
ogy commented on the reasons behind the lack of scientific and technology in the Muslim
world, "We [Muslims] have divided ourselves into little states with very poor facilities and
infrastructure." Id. See also Feature: Science and Technology Key Options for the Muslim
World, Arab News, 11 (July 19, 2000).
83. Rodolphe J.A. De Seife, The Sharia: An Introduction To the Law of Islam 2 (Aus-
tin & Winfield 1994) (noting at the turn of the new millennium the only "pure" Islamic
states, i.e., those that claim the Shariah as the rule of law, are Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan).
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V. CHINA AND THE INTERNET
The exponential growth of the Internet in China is staggering with
the total number of users doubling every 6 months. In January 1999,
China had 2,100,000 Internet users.8 4 In July 1999, that figure nearly
doubled to 4,000,000.85 From July 1999 to January 2000, the number of
Internet users in China doubled from 4,000,000 to 8,900,000.86 In July
2000, the 8,900,000 doubled to 16,900,000.87 The most popular Web site
for Chinese-language users is Sina.com, which attracts 102 million hits
per month.8 8 Among the 46 high-tech hubs deemed most significant in
the new global high-tech network, Wired Magazine listed the Chinese
territories of Hong Kong and Taiwan.8 9 ChinaOnline provided the fol-
lowing facts about China-related Internet activities:
(1) China is MasterCard's second biggest market (2) China will have
300 million Internet users by 2005. By then, the U.S. will have just 200
million. (3) One in four tech companies started in Silicon Valley since
1980 are run by ethnic Chinese and Indian immigrants. (4) The Chi-
nese Web will be larger than the English Web by 2010. (5) American
high tech exports to China grew 500 percent between 1990 and 1998
alone. (6) Over 64% of Chinese Internet users reported they spent less
time watching TV and 67% reported sleeping less since getting the op-
portunity to use the Internet. (7) E-commerce will grow from 1999's
US$42 million to $US3.8 billion by 2003. (8) Fully 28% - and growing -
of Silicon Valley's entrepreneurs are of Chinese origin. (9) China at-
tracts more direct foreign investment than any country except the
United States. (10) China will have more Internet users than any other
Asia-Pacific nation by 2001, with 40 million people online. By 2005,
China will have the most Internet users in the world (Emphasis
84. China Internet Network Info. Center, Statistical Report of the Development of
China Internet (1999.1) <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/e-9901.shtml> (accessed Oct. 24,
2000).
85. China Internet Network Info. Center, Semi-Annual Survey Report on Internet De-
velopment in China (1999.7) <http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/e-9907.shtml> (accessed Oct.
24, 2000).
86. China Internet Network Info. Center, supra n. 85.
87. China Internet Network Info. Center, supra n. 85. (noting that there are 16.9 mil-
lion Internet users in China); Inside China Today Daily News, China Vows to Battle "En-
emy Forces" on Internet <http://www.insidechina.com/news. php3?id=187292> (accessed
Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Enemy Forces].
88. Neel Chowdhury, The New China, Web War, Part 2 <http://www.fortune.com/ for-
tune/chinalwir2.html> (accessed Oct. 24, 2000).
89. Venture Capitals, Wired 258-59 (July 2000). Wired Magazine determined what
constitutes a digital hub of international significance based on several factors: whether
universities and research facilities train skilled workers or develop new technology;
whether established companies and multinationals are present for expertise and economic
stability; whether the population has "entrepreneurial drive" to initiate ventures; and, the
availability of venture capital. Id.
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added). 
9 0
If the above statistics are correct, China, with a population in excess
of 1 billion, will have more Internet users than any country in the world
by 2005. Additional data indicates the average Internet user in China
will be a 35-year-old urban male with a college education. This user will
spend less time watching television and sleeping to use the Internet sev-
eral hours per week.9 1 As a young capitalist, he will embrace a popular
belief espoused since the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, namely, that
wealth is good.9 2 As an educated entrepreneur, he will have more discre-
tionary funds, along with millions of fellow citizens, to engage in e-com-
merce. Estimates suggest that by 2003, online shopping in China will
spread like wildfire, and Chinese consumers will engage in e-commerce
to a considerable extent 93 because household incomes in China are in-
creasing, while technology and online access costs are declining.
9 4
The expansive Internet use in China has been coupled with massive
foreign investment in China's economy. 95 China attracts more foreign
investment than any country in the world except the U.S. 9 6 The U.S.
has invested heavily into China's economy: AT&T invested $81 million in
the early 1990s; Microsoft invested $80 million in 1998 for a research
laboratory; and Motorola invested $1.5 billion between 1998 and 1998.
9 7
A study conducted by the American Bar Association reveals:
90. ChinaOnline, Interesting Facts About China <www.chinaonline.com> (accessed
Nov. 4, 2000).
91. Marty Williams, Survey Reports Big Interests in Internet Among Chinese, Internet
Newsbytes (Apr. 15, 1999). The notion of "getting online" is a significant part of China's
news pop-culture. See Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang, Postmodernism & China (2000).
92. Brian Palmer, The New China What the Chinese Want, Fortune.com, <http:ll
www.fortune.com/fortune/china/gal.html> (accessed Oct. 16, 2000) (providing a Gallup Or-
ganization survey which gauged consumer attitudes and lifestyles in China, in which
among 4,000 people, one-fourth stated that they would like to start their own business).
93. Neel Chowdhury, The New China Web War, Fortune.com, <http://ww.fortune.com/
fortune/chinawir.html> (accessed Oct. 24, 2000).
94. Microsoft Aims to Promote Internet in China Reuter, Business Today <http:ll
www.bostonherald.com/bhbusiness/mschina03lOl999.htm> (accessed Nov. 10, 2000)
(describing how the Microsoft Corporation has sought to make the Internet more wide-
spread in China with the placement of a box atop a television, called the Venus operating
system).
95. Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, The China Reader xvii - xviii (1999). In
1978, China had no direct foreign investments and no foreign debt. Id. In 1997, China had
more foreign investments than all nations, except the U.S., and its debtor status changed
to establish China as the largest borrower from the World Bank. Id. In addition, China's
per capita income quadrupled between 1978 and 1995. Id.
96. ChinaOnline, supra n. 90.
97. Omar Saleem, The Spratly Islands Dispute: China Defines the New Millennium, 15
Am. U. Intl L. Rev. 527, 548-49 (2000) (noting other investors in China include Ford Motor
Company, Time Warner, IBM, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Boeing).
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U.S. investment in China has grown every year since 1992 and reached
a total of $14.1 billion in 1997. U.S. exports to China have also risen
significantly in the past few years, particularly with respect to telecom-
munications, power generation, oil and gas exploration, chemicals, air-
craft, fertilizer, wheat/cereal products, and construction machinery.
China's airport infrastructure construction is anticipated to reach an
estimated sum of $8.4 billion and aircraft sales are estimated at $10 to
15 billion over the next ten years. U.S. firms are pursuing a number of
untapped markets in China, including pharmaceuticals, automotive
components, automotive production machinery, medical equipment and
devices, and transportation.
98
The exponential growth of the Internet in China and the massive
investment in its economy facilitate the emergence of e-commerce. Ques-
tions remain about whether China will adopt the rules for Internet pri-
vacy as espoused by the EU Directive and a U.S. Federal Data Protection
Agency. China, similar to most countries, will eventually enact online
privacy laws. The reasons why a country enacts privacy laws may differ
from one country to the next.
The view articulated in the Privacy Report, is that nations enact pri-
vacy laws for various reasons: to remedy past injustices (Central Europe,
South America and South African); to promote e-commerce (Canada,
U.S. and Asia); and, to comply with the EU Directive for membership in
the European Union (Central and Eastern Europe).9 9 China will likely
accept a U.S. definition for online privacy promulgated by the EU Direc-
tive or a U.S. Federal Data Protection Agency, but with a precondition
and not for above reasons articulated by the Privacy Report.
Domestically, China recognizes a substantive privacy right traced
back to ancient China.10 0 Contemporary China has a commercial legal
system similar to France, Germany, Japan and Taiwan,10 1 which sug-
gest Chinese laws would comport with Western practices to protect on-
98. James M. Zimmerman, China Law Deskbook 1-2 (Am. Bar Assn. 1999). The author
provides an excellent source for various areas of Chinese law such as contracts, taxation,
labor and employment, financial regulations, consumer protection, customs and trade, se-
curities regulations, environmental protection, land use, bankruptcy, dispute resolution,
corporate criminal liability, and laws governing the special zones of the People's Republic of
China). See also Pitman B. Potter, Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of
China: Dilemmas of State, China's Legal Reforms 155, 162 (Stanley B. Lubman ed., Oxford
U. Press 1996) (noting foreign investments in China have increased-$12 billion in 1992,
$57.2 billion in 1992, and $122.7 billion for 1993).
99. See generally Privacy International, supra n. 58.
100. See generally Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Privacy and Human Rights An
International Survey of Privacy: Laws and Practice <http://www.gilc.org/privacy/survey/in-
tro. html> (accessed Aug. 18, 2000).
101. Dr. John S. Mo, The Code of Contract Law of the People's Republic of China and the
Vienna Sales Convention, 15 Am. U. Intl. L. Rev. 209, 211 (1999).
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line privacy. Furthermore, China, unlike the U.S., has a privacy
provision in its constitution. Article 40 of China's constitution provides:
Laws protect the freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens
of the Peoples' Republic of China. No organization or individual may,
on any ground, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of citizens' corre-
spondence except in cases where, to meet the needs of State security or of
investigation into criminal offenses, public security of procuratorial or-
gans are permitted to censor correspondence in accordance with proce-
dures prescribed by law (emphasis added).
10 2
In spite of China's recognition of a right to privacy dating back 5,000
years, and its contemporary commercial laws and constitutional provi-
sion, China, similar to other nations, does not regard privacy as an abso-
lute right.103 It is a right balanced against "the needs of State
security."10 4 The Chinese government has a strong interest in quashing
102. The Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of China, Ch. 2 Art. 40. <http://darkw-
ing.uoregon.edu/-felsing/cstuff/prcconst.html> (accessed Nov. 11, 2000).
103. Seven Schwankert & Johnathan S. Landdreth, China Tightens Control Over Web
Site Publishing <http://www.virtualchina.com/news/janO0/0128/012800-regulations2-ss-
jsl.html> (Nov. 11, 2000) (noting law in China was promulgated with the balancing of an
individual's rights, against the interests of the state or emperor). The balancing of compet-
ing interests is not atypical in privacy disputes within the U.S. Id. In U.S. jurisprudence,
courts often use a balancing test to determine individual rights. Id.; See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). For example, although the Fourth Amendment provides for "probable
cause," the Supreme Court has allowed searches and seizures based on the standard of
reasonable suspicion, which is a lower standard than probable cause. Id.; The Terry deci-
sion acknowledged that a stop and frisk constituted a search and seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes, but allowed the intrusion of a person's privacy interests based on
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. The intrusion into the individual's pri-
vacy was allowed because the Court's interests in protecting the officer's safety outweighed
the need to protect a suspect's privacy. Id. See also Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason:
The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop
and Frisk," 50 Okla. L. Rev. 451, 471 (1997) (discussing the balancing of officer safety and
the need for effective law enforcement against the privacy rights of citizens); US West, Inc.,
v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th cir. 1999) (noting the court balanced consumer's rights to
privacy against commercial interests right to gather and distribute consumer information
pursuant to rights of commercial free speech); Julie Tuan, US West v. FCC, 15 Berkeley
Tech. L. J. 354 (2000) (critiquing the West decision); Joan Biskupic, Court Limits Police
Records Access <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27555-1999Dec.7html>
(accessed Nov. 10, 2000) (discussing the Los Angeles Police Dept. v. Reporting Publishing
Corp. decision where the Court weighed privacy rights against commercial interests). Id.
The Court upheld a 1996 California law, which restricted access to police records to jour-
nalists and prohibited access of the same information to a private publishing service that
sold the information to lawyers and other businesses. Id.
104. Frank Webster, Theories of Information Society 52-73 (Routledge 1995) (explaining
that we live in an information-orientated world that has become more organized and
global, and therefore the allegiance to statehood and self-preservation remains constant,
and information and surveillance have become means of warfare to preserve the state).
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dissidents, maintaining social order,' 0 5 and screening information that
is politically sensitive or harmful to the state. 10 6 The popular case of
Huang Qi is illustrative. Huang Qi published information about the
1989 Tiananmen Square crack down on his site named www.6-
4tianwang.com, and was charged with "subverting state power" and
faced a sentence of life imprisonment. 10 7 The Chinese government has
indicated that while the Internet has healthy and beneficial information,
it also contains information that is reactionary, superstitious and porno-
graphic.1 0 8 Therefore, the government has vowed to battle the "enemies
of the state" who use the Internet to undermine the state,10 9 and has
issued regulations restricting the "transfer of state secrets on bulletin
board systems, in chat rooms or through Internet news groups."1 10 The
problem is that the term "state secret" is ambiguous and could include a
wide range of persons and activities."' This inherent ambiguity is a
logical result because the Chinese government propounds a "democratic"
system, which dictates that a collective character ensures individual
rights. 112 In other words, social control through a Communist dictator-
ship is the key towards a successful democracy.
113
In conjunction with China's national security concerns, China's con-
ception of privacy is also influenced by its culture. What is considered
private in the U.S. differs from what is private in China. This is illus-
trated by China's current use of public showers, and how domestic dis-
putes are handled as a public matter, rather than a private one.
1 1 4
The Chinese government's interest in state security and the cultural
components of privacy indicates that privacy is perceived as something
different in China when compared with Western notions of privacy.
11 5
This suggests that if China were to enact privacy regulation to comply
with the EU Directive or the rules promulgated by a U.S. Federal Data
Protection Agency, China's would not do so to protect privacy as defined
105. See generally Schwankert & Landdreth, supra n. 103; Chih-yu Shih, Collective De-
mocracy Political and Legal Reform in China 59 (The Chinese U. Press 1999).
106. See generally Schwankert & Landdreth, supra n. 103.
107. See China Says Provinces Setting Up Internet Police, Silicon Valley News, <http://
www.mercurycenter.com/svtech/news/breaking/internetdocs/2781141.htm> (accessed Aug.
7, 2000).
108. Enemy Forces, supra n. 87.
109. Id.
110. Schwankert & Landdreth, supra n. 103.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Shih, supra n. 105, at 57-60.
113. Id.
114. Fu Hualing, Understanding People's Mediation in Post-Mao China, 6 J. Chinese L.
211 (1992).
115. David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An Interna-
tional Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18
John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 1, 31-32 (1999).
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in the West. 116 In fact, China has had a long history of tracking its citi-
zens for record keeping purposes, 117 and an intolerance for encryption
technology."l 8 Therefore, if the Chinese government complies with
Western theories of online privacy, its primary purposes for doing may
be tangential to a policy for protection of online privacy' 19
In the past, China has manipulated issues that are "fundamental" to
the industrialized nations to enable China to achieve its economic or po-
litical goals. China used this tactic with the U.S. as early as the 1 9 th
century. In 1821, a sailor aboard a U.S. merchant ship, called the Emily,
dropped a ceramic bottle on the head of a Chinese fruit seller who occu-
pied a smaller boat below the Emily.120 The fruit seller fell overboard
and drowned. The Chinese government was outraged and insisted that
the sailor face trial before a Chinese court. 121 The captain of the Emily
refused to release the sailor and insisted that the trial would occur
aboard the Emily. The Chinese government immediately ordered the
suspension of all U.S. trade in the Canton region. In response, the cap-
tain released the sailor to the Chinese authorities. He was executed the
following day. 1
22
In atypical fashion, the merchant ship Emily case involved a dispute
in which both China and the U.S. had significant interests. China
sought preservation of its territorial sovereignty and the integrity of it
courts, and the U.S, wanted to protect its sovereignty and preserve its
trading relationship with China. Typically, with conflicts between the
U.S. and China, the U.S. has a fundamental interest involved, and China
deems the issue of less significance. Nonetheless, the case illustrates
how China has historically used Western trade interests against the
West as a means to obtain a goal in China's interest.
In recent times, China's treatment of copyrights when contrasted
with U.S. treatment of copyrights provides another example of how
China manipulates U.S. interests to obtain a particular goal. 123 Histori-
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Christina A. Cockburn, Where the United States Goes the World Will Follow -
Won't it?, 21 Hous. J. Intl. L. 491, 527 (1999).
119. See generally Banisar & Davies, supra n. 115.
120. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China 127 (1990) (explaining the
treatment of aliens under Chinese law in the 18"h century).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Copyright disputes in the U.S. have had significant impact on technological ad-
vancements. See Lawrence D. Graham, Legal Battles That Shaped the Computer Industry,
16, 87 (Quorum Books 1999) (citing cases including United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F.
Supp. 535 (D.Mass. 1994), and Whelan v. Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307
(D.C.Pa. 1985), in the discussion of how the battle over copyright protections for software is
one, which, along with other disputes, has defined the computer industry).
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cally, copyright protection has been an important right in industrialized
nations. 12 4 China, however, has failed to recognize copyright protections
from a Western perspective. 12 5 This variance between the U.S. and
China has resulted in disputes about whether China sufficiently protects
U.S. artists' rights when it fails to restrict unauthorized reproductions.
China had minimal interest in copyright protection but complied with
U.S. demands to protect copyrights so that China could achieve U.S. sup-
port for its GATT accession. 12 6 The Chinese government made the U.S.
interest in copyright protection a political issue and protected U.S. copy-
right when the U.S. agreed to give China support for GATT.1
27
China also manipulated one issue to achieve another purpose after
the revolt in Tiananmen Square. Following Tiananmen Square, the in-
ternational community reacted strongly against China. 128 The Chinese
government freed two Chinese democratic leaders and allowed them to
leave for the U.S. in exchange for the normalization of bilateral diplo-
matic relations. 129 In hopes of lessening the post-Tiananmen Square
pressure from the U.S., the Chinese government also strengthened
China's copyright and patent laws. 130 In effect, the Chinese government
"recognized" human rights and intellectual property rights to achieve
diplomatic credibility.
13 1
124. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.8. The U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall
have the power . .. [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." Id. See also Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure:
Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 777 (2000) (ex-
amining the history of English property rights as they evolved into U.S. copyright protec-
tions); Jessica Litman, Free Speech and Electronic Commerce, Private Censorship
Conference Paper, <http://webserver.law.yale.edu/censor/litman. htm> (accessed Oct. 16,
2000) (discussing the tension between free "speech" - speech that does not cost anything
- and the merchants' interests to own and regulate speech through copyright).
125. William P. Alford, To Steal A Book Is an Elegant Offense Intellectual Property Law
in Chinese Civilization 1 (Stanford U. Press 1995) (discussing why intellectual property law
has never taken hold in China and that prior to the mid-1980s most of East Asia had weak
enforcement of intellectual property rights).
126. Amy S. Simpson, Copyright Law and Software Regulations in the People's Republic
of China: Have the Chinese Pirates Affected World Trade?, 20 N.C. J. Intl. L. & Com. Reg.
575-76, 625 (1995).
127. Id. at 576.
128. David E. Christensen, Breaking the Deadlock: Toward A Socialist-Confucian Con-
cept of Human Rights for China, 13 Mich. J. Intl. L. 469, 510-511 (1992); see also, Kaoru
Okuizumi, Implementing the ODA Charter: Prospects for Linking Japanese Economic Assis-
tance and Human Rights, 27 N.Y.U. J. Intl. L. & Pol. 367, 393 (1995).
129. See Christensen, supra n. 128, at 511.
130. Murray Scot Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking in China 221 (Clarendon Press
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Another example of how China used one issue to achieve another
purpose occurred during negotiations between China, the U.S. and the
EU for China's accession in the World Trade Organization ('WTO").1
3 2
During the period expanding from the 1980s until the year 2000, the
U.S. had an annual review of China's trade status, and China repeatedly
sought membership in the WTO. 133 During the WTO talks at the begin-
ning of the new millennium, the U.S. hesitated in its decision to vote for
China's accession to the WTO. Subsequently, China announced a ruling
that banned foreign investments in China's telecommunication/internet
industry. 134 This was alarming news to U.S.'businesses who had al-
ready invested millions into China's Internet and perceived China as a
market for huge business potential. 13 5 The U.S. commercial interests
encouraged the Clinton Administration to permanently normalize U.S.
trade with China, by making China a member of WTO. 13 6 In effect, the
Chinese government used U.S. interests in China's enormous business
potential (consisting of over a billion potential consumers) to force the
U.S. and the EU to make concession in the WTO negotiations in ex-
change for China's lifting of the investment ban.
1 37
The U.S. government should not prematurely establish a Federal
Data Protection Agency to define and regulate Internet privacy. The
premature establishment of an agency to regulate Internet privacy could
place the U.S. at a disadvantage in negotiations with China similar to
the U.S. position during the WTO negotiations. If China needs the EU or
the U.S. to compromise something unrelated to the Internet, then China
could enact privacy laws with burdensome standards that would infringe
upon U.S. business investments in Internet commerce. 138 For example,
China could fail to develop or utilize online credit rules, distribution and
delivery infrastructures, catalogue shopping, widespread credit card use,
procedures to overcome language barriers, or encryption technology.
Also, in an attempt to entice China to accept Internet privacy regulations
established by the U.S. and EU, the U.S. may acquiesce to privacy intru-
132. Helene Cooper & David Rogers, China Trade Bill Passes Final Test: Senate, Wall
St. J., A2 (Sept. 20, 2000).
133. Id.
134. Schwankert & Landdreth, supra n. 103.
135. Cooper & Rogers, supra n. 132.
136. Id.
137. Infoporn Raw Data, China's Party Line, Wired, 109 (Sept. 2000) (explaining that
the parties eventually agreed that if China joined the WTO, then foreign investments in
telecommunications would be capped at 49%).
138. World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference Second Session, Declaration on
Global Electronic Commerce <http://www.ustr.gov/wto/geneva.shtml> (accessed Nov. 4,
2000) (noting the free flow of commerce on the Internet depends on nations enforcing com-
mitments to telecommunication and financial services, duty-free arrangements, a lack of
technical trade barriers, nondiscriminatory access for network and service providers).
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sions. For example, China could curtail online communications and
claim concerns about "state secrets," and the curtailment could signifi-
cantly impact legitimate communications and e-commerce because "state
secrets" is a broad term. What would the U.S. concede in order to per-
suade China to narrow its definition of "state secret" to facilitate e-com-
merce, and its counterpart privacy? Perhaps China and the West would
agree that it would be an "invasion of privacy" for any U.S. corporation to
ask a Chinese citizen, residing on the mainland, about anything "politi-
cal." Would "political" questions justify privacy intrusions by the state
and form the basis of a legal cause of action against the particular for-
eign corporation conducting online business in China? Will the U.S.
agree to limit online speech to a narrowly defined concept of commercial
activity and allow intrusions of individual rights and sanction any coun-
try that violates China's ban on "political" speech? Will cyberspace have
a realm where speech is free, and another realm where speech is limited
and the dominant concern is commerce? Will this in turn create tiers of
cyberspace communications where privacy is protected in certain realms,
to varying degrees, and so-called lesser tiers will exist for renegade na-
tions and businesses failing to comport with a definition of privacy
promulgated by a U.S. Federal Data Protection Agency?
The U.S. and the EU have tremendous stakes in e-commerce. It is
estimated that in 1998, e-commerce business totaled $102 billion, 139 and
worldwide business-to-business e-commerce is estimated to reach $2.7
trillion by 2004.140 Both the U.S. and the EU have considerable expecta-
tions for profits from the Chinese market. 14 1 There is a strong possibil-
ity that, with billions of dollars at stake, commercial interests will trump
strategic long-term foreign policy planning. Commercial interests in sus-
taining e-commerce should not be underestimated because market pri-
orities are the decisive influences on computer related technologies.
14 2
Predictably, both the U.S. and the EU would make concessions in
some other areas in exchange for China's agreement to accept Western
privacy standards. Will such commercial interest cause the U.S. to sacri-
139. Internet Domain Name and Intellectual Property Rights: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts and the Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (1999) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/chas0728.htm> (accessed Nov. 4, 2000) (not-
ing testimony of Anne Chasser, President of the International Trademark Association).
140. Rich Whiting, E-data for a Price, Info. Week 44, 45 (Aug. 25, 2000).
141. Chinese Development Zone Draws Investors, ChinaE News, People's Daily <http://
www.chinae.com/ENEWS/131_39.HTM> (accessed Oct. 17, 2000) (explaining that one de-
velopment zone in China, called the Fuzhou Economic Development Zone, - located in the
Fujian Province - has investors from more than 20 countries including Britain, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy and Japan). See also Ellen Bork, Dot-Commies, The Weekly Stan-
dard 16 (May 15, 2000) (stating that China's market has always had a seductive hold on
America).
142. Frank Webster, Theories of the Information Society 71 (1995).
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fice strategic or military interests? As we proceed into the new millen-
nium, China has international concerns about its accession into the
WTO, military development, the Spratly Islands, and Taiwan. 143 The
U.S. must develop a policy for U.S.-China relations and engage in well-
thought planning and negotiations lest U.S. businesses dictate, in a
piecemeal fashion, U.S.-China policy. It is likely that a lack of strategic
planning will cause the U.S. to concede Taiwan and other issues to China
due to U.S. business pressures which will arise in response to China
tightening its control over Internet privacy.'
4 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The increased scholarship, public rage, the sheer volume of subject
matter on the Internet, debates about the role of government and the
lack of clarity in U.S. privacy laws, have ushered forth a sense of urgency
to develop a workable definition for online privacy. The EU model of a
privacy regulator is an attractive option, which suggests the U.S. should
consider the establishment of a Federal Data Protection Agency. Due to
the global nature of the Internet, the U.S. should study the feasibility of
a Federal Data Protection Agency, and also consider a more globally in-
clusive approach towards defining Internet privacy. The U.S. must
adopt a "Marco-Polo-like" approach and go beyond the belief that the
Western view is the only view. The West must consider the views of the
East (and others) and seek a more global definition of privacy for online
communications. In particular, the U.S. and the EU should remain cog-
nizant of the fact that China has a population of more than a billion and
that China will soon have more Internet users than any other country in
the world. If the U.S. establishes a Federal Data Protection Agency and
develops a policy for privacy in a haphazard and uncoordinated fash-
ion 145 -solely from a Western perspective-to govern the global In-
ternet, then the U.S. may become disadvantaged in its dealings with
China or find itself embroiled in a dispute. Because China has a strong
143. Saleem, supra n. 97, at 532-536.
144. Id. Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged the need for an effective U.S-
China policy when he stated, "But in the meantime[until increased freedom in China], we
will treat China as she merits. Id. A strategic partner she is not, but neither is China our
inevitable and implacable foe. Id. China is a competitor, a potential regional rival, but also
a trading partner willing to cooperate in areas where our strategic interests overlap." Id.;
see Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Remarks at Confirmation Hearing (Jan. 17,
2001), Secretary of State-Designate Colin L. Powell <http:www.state.gov/s/index.cfm?
docid=443> (accessed Jan. 22, 2001).
145. Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1095, 1107-134 (1996)
(An analogous argument was made by Dan L. Burk, in his advocacy for Federal control,
rather than state control, over the Internet based on the federal government's powers
under the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution).
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economy and its Internet users double every month, it has become a
country of investment opportunities and controversy. A recent contro-
versy about domain registration provides an illustration of this point.
Through the authorization of the U.S.-based Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Network Solutions Inc.
("NSI"), a U.S.-base domain-name registration provider, announced its
plan to provide Chinese Internet user registration services for Chinese
domain names ending in ".com," ".net," or ".org.' u 46 The Chinese govern-
ment opposed this practice asserting that it was unreasonable to allow a
foreign corporation to control the technical solutions on Chinese domain-
name registration. 14 7 In theory, ICANN has the sole power to appoint
registrars around the world to govern the use of Top Level Domain
Names ("gTLDs").148 The Chinese government refused to accept the
rules established by ICANN, and the China Internet Network Informa-
tion Center ("CNNIC") declared itself as the only body authorized to reg-
ister Chinese language domain names. 149 CNNIC also established
dispute resolution policies that differed from those established by
ICANN. °5 0 The question is whether ICANN or CNNIC will control the
registration of Chinese language domain names? Another question is
whether other countries will follow China's position that ICANN is too
Western focused and biased towards multi-national corporations?' 5 '
In the establishment of a Federal Data Protection Agency to regu-
late Internet Privacy, the U.S. should consider the questions the U.S.
Department of Commerce posed for consumer protection in the global
electronic marketplace. There are concerns about the protections which
exist for consumers engaged in electronic commerce with foreign nations;
the extent that existing laws, conventions, treaties or practices provide
effective protection for consumers who engaged in electronic commerce
with foreign businesses; the controlling law, courts or systems to govern
transactions; the extent to which existing laws and modification of laws
or systems are necessary; the impact of such modification on commerce,
legal systems, and law enforcement; the ability to choose forums and
contract with foreign nations; appropriate remedies and the enforcement
of judgments and the minimum protections required.
15 2
146. See China: If ICANN, So Can We <http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANNOW/busi-




150. See Complete CNNIC Rules for Domain-Name Disputes, <httpJ/www.chinaonline.
com/topstories/00 11 10/1/C00110202.asp> (accessed Jan. 18, 2001).
151. ICANN, supra n. 147.
152. U.S. Perspective on Consumer Protection in the Global Electronic Marketplace, 63
Fed. Reg. 69, 289 (Dec. 6, 1998). The questions are taken, in part and paraphrased, from
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There are indeed concerns about Internet privacy, but if the U.S.
establishes a Federal Data Protection Agency to regulate privacy, the
international scope and impact of such an agency must be thoroughly
considered because China, despite U.S. law, will also issue regulations to
govern the Internet. 153 Perhaps the essential question is how will the
U.S. adjust when 1.23 billion mainland Chinese begin to use and regu-
late the Internet?'
5 4
those raised by the FTC when it examined the impact and viability of U.S. consumer pro-
tection practices in the global market place. Id.
153. See Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty? - The Internet and the International
System, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 647, 654 (1997) (noting China has had a record of Internet
regulation). See also Mo Zhang, China Issues New Rules Strengthening Regulatory Struc-
ture Over Internet, 19 No. 11 E. Asian Exec. Rep. 9 (1997); Internet, Chinese Style: Rapid
Growth, "Wild West" Atmosphere, But Will It Open Up Info Flows, 20 No. 7 E. Asian Exec.
Rep. 8 (1998); Caroline Mead & Phil Zender, Asian Developments, 3 No. 5 Cyberspace L. 22
(1998).
154. The question of the U.S. response to China's development is an offshoot of the one
posed by noted China scholar Ross Terrill in 1978 when he essentially wondered: If 900
million Chinese succeed, how will we adjust? See, Ross Terrill, The Future of China After
Mao 255 (Rigby Adelaide 1978).
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